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I.  Introduction
To promote the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Union, the Commission has introduced a proposal 
for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (in the following: EPPO initiative).1 This initiative is 
based on Arts. 86 and 325 TFEU that provide the compe-
tence for the European Union to counter fraud and other of-
fenses affecting its financial interests. The objective of this 
initiative is to establish a coherent European system for more 
efficient and effective investigation and prosecution as well 
as to enhance the deterrence of offenses affecting the finan-
cial interests of the European Union. It also aims at ensuring 
closer cooperation and the effective information exchange 
between the European Union and competent authorities of 
the Member States. Therefore, the initiative sets forward the 
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office that 
will be exclusively competent in cases of fraud against the 
European Union. For such cases, the establishment of the Eu-
ropean Public Prosecutor’s Office includes the introduction 
of investigative competences, the right to prosecute, and the 
right to bring a case before the competent national judge in 
any Member State of the European Union. In each Member 
State, one or more delegated public prosecutors will be ap-
pointed who, on behalf of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, will bring these cases before the competent national 
authorities.
The shaping of the EPPO initiative has gone on for many 
years and been discussed many times in the Member States 
by government officials and scholars.2 Some of these discus-
sions tended to take a critical approach to the EPPO initiative. 
The Dutch government also made critical comments on this 
initiative. This has even led the Dutch government to continue 
to withhold its approval on the EPPO initiative. Against this 
background, the present article addresses the following ques-
tions: How has it come so far? Are the Dutch really against 
this initiative (cf. 2)? And what are the main current Dutch 
concerns in conjunction with the EPPO initiative (cf. 3 and 4)? 
Many of these concerns seem to have a common denomina-
tor: the EPPO initiative does not respect the sovereignty of 
the Dutch State. Is this really true (cf. 5)? And if this initiative 
were eventually to be accepted, what are key issues for its suc-
cess or failure (cf. 6)?
II.  General Dutch Approach to the EPPo Initiative
The relationship between European community law and Dutch 
criminal law has always been problematic. In 1992, the Dutch 
Minister of Justice described this relationship as being politi-
cally extremely sensitive.3 The first ideas for the establishment 
of the EPPO – laid down in the Corpus Juris4 and later in the 
Green Paper on the establishment of a European Public Pros-
ecutor (in the following: Green Paper)5 – also met with criti-
cism. Although, some Dutch scholars had been working on the 
Corpus Juris for several years, other Dutch scholars eyed this 
project critically. Strong criticism was voiced by Fijnaut who 
disqualifies some of the starting points of the Corpus Juris as 
nonsense. The whole idea of an EPPO seems unrealistic to him 
because such an office cannot be expected to develop an effec-
tive investigation and prosecution policy without having any 
effective competence over the police and the public prosecut-
ing offices in the Member States.6 Fijnaut and Groenhuijsen 
also considered fundamental arguments in the Green Paper 
to be unconvincing and inadequate for implementation in the 
Member States.7
On the political level, there also seems to be little support for 
the institutions of the EU. Since the millennium, Dutch politi-
cians have been critical of the general policies of these insti-
tutions and their efforts towards harmonization. This attitude 
is probably influenced by critical sentiments in Dutch public 
opinion. A first sign of the lack of support for the European 
harmonization was the negative referendum on the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe when the majority of 
the Dutch voted against it in June 2005. Things became worse 
when the European Union was faced with banking crises, Euro 
crises, and refugee crises. The overall Dutch sentiment seems 
to be that the institutions of the European Union are unable 
to fix these problems and therefore the legitimation of these 
institutions is in decline. Recently, this sentiment was reflected 
in the outcome of an advisory referendum on the Association 
Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. A few 
days before the referendum, its initiators declared that, in their 
opinion, the referendum was really about the policy of the in-
stitutions of the EU. The Dutch voted in majority for the rejec-
tion of the Association Agreement at the end of 2015; because 
the referendum was advisory, this outcome does not however 
bind the Dutch government to heed the result.
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This euroscepticism in Dutch public opinion is reflected in a 
growing euroscepticism in both right-wing and left-wing po-
litical parties. This is also true for the EPPO initiative. The 
debate on the EPPO initiative led the Dutch parliament to 
instigate the so-called yellow card procedure at the end of 
October 2013. This procedure was supported by national par-
liaments in eleven other Member States and has resulted in 
further discussion on the EPPO initiative with the European 
Commission. A general observation is that, in the beginning, 
these discussions did not lead to more consensus: the Dutch 
government repeated its arguments against the EPPO initiative 
and the Commission repeated its arguments in favor of it. This 
response of the Commission led to considerable irritation in 
the Dutch parliament as it felt that it had not been taken seri-
ously.8 However, the latest outcome of this discussion shows 
that the Commission has changed the EPPO initiative into a 
more “Member State-oriented” proposal. This new orientation 
of the Commission has certainly improved the level of support 
for the initiative in the Member States.9 But the Dutch par-
liament is still following a far-reaching motion on the Dutch 
approach towards this initiative. This motion clearly stipulates 
that the Dutch Minister of Justice is not entitled to give his 
consent to the EPPO initiative, neither as a whole nor to any 
part of this initiative.10 Accordingly, consent to the EPPO ini-
tiative may only be given by the Dutch parliament. This means 
that during the Dutch presidency of the European Union, the 
Dutch Minister of Justice may only discuss certain issues con-
cerning the EPPO initiative but has to refrain from any form 
of consent.11
III.   Arguments of the Dutch Parliament against the  
EPPo Initiative
So far it is clear that the legal framework of the EPPO may 
only be approved by the Dutch parliament. But what hinders 
this approval? The main arguments against the EPPO initiative 
were formulated in the position paper of the Dutch parliament 
on the EPPO initiative of 11 April 2014.12 This position paper 
follows the basic arguments of the Dutch Senate that have led 
to the aforementioned yellow card procedure and a letter to 
the European Commission in which these arguments are com-
municated.13 The vast majority of the Dutch parliament holds 
the opinion that the investigation, prosecution, and sentenc-
ing of criminal activities must be undertaken at the national 
level. Any transfer of these competences would be in breach of 
the concept of sovereignty of the state.14 Therefore, the legal 
foundation of the EPPO is not recognized. Furthermore, and 
in contrast with the view of the European Commission, the ne-
cessity for the EPPO is denied. Or, to put it in European terms: 
the principle of subsidiarity15 effects that the EPPO lacks a 
sufficient legal basis because the Member States already deal 
with the investigation and prosecution of criminal acts that 
endanger the financial interests of the European Union. Also, 
there seems to be little belief in the view of the Commission 
that the protection of financial interests will improve in the 
hands of the EPPO. This belief seems to follow the observation 
of Fijnaut and Groenhuijsen that there is a lack of empirical 
research, meaning that cross-border crimes such as EU-fraud 
are poorly investigated and prosecuted in the Member States, 
that legal cooperation between these Member States lacks ef-
ficiency, and that this would improve if the EPPO were to take 
over the investigation and prosecution of EU fraud.16
Other arguments question the necessity of competences fore-
seen in the EPPO initiative and suggest that they are not in 
line with the principle of proportionality.17 There is too much 
uncertainty about which criminal activities the EPPO is com-
petent to investigate and prosecute. The foreseen general com-
petence of the EPPO for each criminal activity that endangers 
the financial interests of the EU is considered too broad and 
not in conformity with the legality principle. It would create a 
lack of democratic control over the EPPO and also too much 
uncertainty on what this means for the (breach of) sovereignty 
in the Member States.18 There should be accountability at the 
Member State level for the actions and results of investigation, 
prosecution, and sentencing of criminal activities. It is con-
sidered unacceptable that democratic control over the EPPO 
is foreseen in an annual report that only will be presented to 
the European Parliament, whereas the actual investigation and 
prosecution would take place in the Member States.
The better alternative for the EPPO initiative would be more 
effective cooperation between Member States as well as in Eu-
rojust and Europol, and with OLAF.19 The Commission should 
focus more on how to facilitate this cooperation. In addition, 
there is no convincing argument for decreasing the role of 
OLAF to pave the way for the installation of the EPPO. Even 
if there would be a sound legal basis for OLAF, then it would 
be well advised to have an advisory and supervisory role in the 
efforts of the Member States to investigate and prosecute EU 
fraud. The primary responsibility for these efforts lies at the 
level of the Member States. The EPPO is only an institution 
of last resort. It could only take action if a Member State were 
to neglect its responsibility to investigate and prosecute a case 
of EU fraud.20
Moreover, it is unclear how the exclusive competence of the 
EPPO really relates to the responsibility of Member States to 
investigate and prosecute national fraud cases. It seems curi-
ous that Member States which actively combat EU-fraud are 
excluded once the EPPO is competent, even if these activities 
on the part of the Member States appears to be faster, more ef-
fective, and less expensive. The general coordinating role that 
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is foreseen for the EPPO appears problematic because it has 
consequences for the priorities and the use of financial budgets 
at the national level of the Member States. Furthermore, the 
EPPO initiative lacks a concrete procedure in which differ-
ences of opinion between the EPPO and Member States can 
be resolved.21
IV.  Arguments of the Dutch Government against the 
EPPo Initiative
Besides the arguments in the position paper of the parliament, 
the Dutch government holds the opinion that the legal basis 
of the EPPO should be limited to Art. 86 para. 1 TFEU only. 
That means that other (related) cross-border crimes are not 
part of this mandate. The Dutch government rejects the option 
of the Commission (that Art. 86 as a whole is a legal basis for 
the EPPO) because this could lead to an enlargement of the 
mandate of the EPPO for crimes other than EU fraud.22 This 
enlargement as such is possible according to Art. 86 para. 4 
TFEU upon unanimous consent of the European Council, after 
approval by the European Parliament, and after consultation of 
the Commission.
In the view of the Dutch government, the EPPO initiative fur-
ther implies that a considerable number of OLAF employees 
would be reallocated as a staff members of the EPPO. This 
would reduce the operating costs of the EPPO on the one hand 
but, on the other, the Dutch government is concerned that this 
reallocation would lead to a shift in administrative enforce-
ment towards a more criminal one. This shift could seriously 
conflict with the general idea of criminal enforcement as an in-
strument of last resort (ultimum remedium).23 The Dutch gov-
ernment only agrees to the EPPO under the condition that the 
level of enforcement of national fraud cases remains the same. 
That means that the EPPO hands over the cases that it does 
not investigate to the Member States at the earliest possible 
moment, in order to ensure that the Member States can uphold 
their current level of administrative and criminal enforcement 
of national fraud cases.
Furthermore, the Dutch government observes that the internal 
working process of the EPPO in dealing with EU fraud cases 
is rather centralistic. Although the delegated public prosecu-
tors are appointed for the enforcement in criminal cases in the 
Member States, according to the Commission’s proposal they 
have to consult the European Public Prosecutor for almost ev-
ery decision to get his consent. This method of decision-mak-
ing promotes a uniform policy but does not take into account 
that, usually, only the public prosecutor and the investigation 
team dealing with a certain fraud case know the ins and outs 
of the case and are therefore in a better position to make the 
necessary decisions. Therefore, it seems that the better posi-
tion for a European Public Prosecutor would be as a general 
coordinator in cross-border cases. Also, the European Public 
Prosecutor is entitled to investigate and prosecute a criminal 
case without any communication with the delegated public 
prosecutor. The Dutch government ultimately questions the 
necessity of the competence of the EPPO to investigate and 
prosecute a criminal case without any communication with the 
delegated public prosecutor as well as the practical applicabil-
ity of this procedure.24
 V.  the sovereignty Argument
A common denominator in the aforementioned arguments of 
the Dutch parliament as well as those of the Dutch govern-
ment is the concept of sovereignty of the state. According to 
this concept, it is the nation state and parliament that have the 
exclusive competence over the use of criminal instruments, 
also when the investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of 
EU fraud are concerned. Furthermore, this competence can 
only be shared after consent of the Dutch state and parliament. 
In accordance with this interpretation, the concept of sover-
eignty seems obvious and in line with the interpretation of the 
founding father of the concept, Jean Bodin. He introduced this 
concept at the end of the 16th century and described it as the 
power to decide that is in the hands of the nation state.25 In his 
view, the power of the state is the highest power and cannot be 
shared. Essentially, it consists of three elements: the people, 
the territory, and the exclusive power by an authority of the 
state.
In Bodin’s time, it was obvious that these three elements were 
embedded in the national state. In our times, we must ques-
tion this position due to the concept of the European Union. 
First, the European Union does not only consist of national 
peoples but also of foreign peoples that have equal rights in a 
European legal space of freedom, security and justice (Art. 3 
para. 2 TEU). Second, the national territories of the Member 
States are part of this European legal space and these Member 
States are bound to cooperate in good faith with the EU (Art. 4 
para. 3 TEU). This European legal space also applies to the 
responsibility to combat EU fraud in an efficient and deter-
rent manner, as is shown by the ECJ’s judgment in the Greek 
Maize case26 that lies at the heart of Art. 325 TFEU. Third, 
the power of the European Union is not exercised by national 
authorities but in the Commission, the European Council, and 
the European Parliament. The essence of this observation is 
that sovereignty in the European Union is a concept that is no 
longer purely national but European. Both national and EU 
institutions need each other, especially concerning the combat-
ing of cross-border crime that perhaps can be better dealt with 
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on a European level.27 What seems characteristic so far for the 
Dutch approach to the EPPO initiative is the overriding use of 
a purely national concept of sovereignty. This concept seems 
outdated and does not recognize the role of EU institutions in 
the European legal space, especially where the competence to 
deal with EU fraud is concerned. Given this national concept, 
it is understandable that the Dutch parliament and government 
use the principle of subsidiarity as a line of defense against the 
EU, while the alternative could be to explore together with the 
EU institutions how EU fraud could be best combatted on a 
European level.
VI.  Effective Competence over the national Enforcement
Even if the EPPO initiative became acceptable for the Dutch 
parliament and government, it still is not clear whether and 
to what extent the EPPO really can offer an effective inves-
tigation and prosecution policy without having any effective 
competence over the police and the public prosecuting offices 
in the Member States. Bearing in mind the basic critique of 
Fijnaut on the Green Paper (see supra 2.), this issue is of great 
importance for the success of the EPPO. The starting point 
is that the EPPO be exclusively competent for the investiga-
tion and prosecution of criminal activities that endanger the 
financial interests of the EU described in the (proposed) PIF 
Directive.28 The EPPO is competent if these criminal activities 
occur on the territory of a Member State or when the alleged 
offender is a national of a Member State or an employee of 
an EU institution.29 The competence for the investigation and 
prosecution is assigned to the delegated public prosecutor un-
less there are conditions for the European Public Prosecutor to 
claim exclusive competence. The delegated public prosecutor 
then takes the necessary steps to investigate and prosecute.30
At this point, the support of national police forces in the Mem-
ber States is required. This support could become problematic 
since the Dutch police is embedded in a national hierarchic 
structure, i.e., during investigations in criminal cases, the 
Dutch public prosecutor is in charge of these investigations 
and competent to give the necessary instructions to the po-
lice.31 The Dutch Minister of Justice is politically responsible 
for the use of these instructions and therefore entitled to give 
general and specific instructions to the Dutch public prosecut-
ing office.32 This political responsibility means that the Min-
ister of Justice is accountable to the Dutch parliament for his 
criminal policy and the supervision over criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution. It is foreseeable that this accountability 
will be questioned in the Dutch parliament at the moment the 
Minister has to explain that certain investigations and pros-
ecuting decisions were undertaken within the competence of 
either the European Public Prosecutor or the delegated Dutch 
public prosecutor. The implication would then be that the Min-
ister cannot be held accountable for these actions as the EPPO 
is competent. Hopefully, the Dutch parliament can learn to live 
with this dual competence over national enforcement.
Also the delegated Dutch public prosecutor will be faced with 
the consequences of dual competence. Acting on behalf of the 
EPPO will raise discussions over the required budgets for the 
investigation and prosecution of EU fraud cases. These bud-
gets usually are reallocated for national fraud cases only, and 
the use for international cases on behalf of the EPPO probably 
requires consent from the national government and the parlia-
ment. As a consequence the delegated Dutch public prosecutor 
is confronted with a conflict of loyalties as he is accountable 
for the use of required budgets to the EPPO and the national 
authorities. 
The position of the delegated public prosecutor is further com-
promised because his mandate is limited in time. His appoint-
ment is foreseen for five years, with the possibility of prolon-
gation, but he may be relieved of his duties exclusively by 
the European Public Prosecutor.33 What does this mean for the 
loyalty of the delegated public prosecutor towards the nation-
al public prosecuting office? He should be loyal towards the 
EPPO,34 but when his mandate ends will his loyalty towards 
the national public prosecution office not be questioned? Since 
Dutch public prosecutors are not appointed for life, this could 
mean that a delegated public prosecutor might look for another 
career outside the national public prosecuting office once his 
mandate for the EPPO has expired. To prevent this from hap-
pening, some additional protection should be considered con-
cerning the position of the delegated public prosecutor after 
his mandate has expired.
The dual competence over the enforcement by national agents 
becomes more problematic if we look at the ancillary compe-
tence of the EPPO as foreseen in Art. 13 of the EPPO initia-
tive. Accordingly, the EPPO has – under certain conditions – 
competence over criminal activities not mentioned in the PIF 
Directive but inextricably linked to them. This opens the pos-
sibility that national cases be claimed by the EPPO because of 
their close relationship with EU fraud. In case of such a claim, 
the EPPO shall consult the national public prosecuting office 
and possibly Eurojust. If this consultation does not lead to an 
agreement, the decision will be made by “the national judicial 
authority competent to decide on the attribution of compe-
tences concerning prosecution at national level” (Art. 13 pa-
ras. 2 and 3 of the EPPO initiative). This sounds reasonable, 
but who is this national judicial authority in the Netherlands? 
It is not the Minister of Justice because he is not a judicial 
authority and only politically responsible for the prosecuting 
decisions of the Dutch public prosecuting office. The Dutch 
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public prosecuting office has the so-called monopoly on the 
decision to prosecute.35 This decision does not require any 
consent of a judge unless on appeal of a directly interested 
party that disagrees with the decision not to prosecute (further) 
or the decision to prosecute for a lesser offence.36 This appeal 
is foreseen as a counterbalance to the exclusive competence to 
prosecute assigned to the Dutch public prosecutor. Therefore, 
the judges are entitled to examine the prosecuting decision as 
to legal aspects as well as aspects of efficiency in this appeal 
procedure. It is, however, questionable whether Art. 13 para. 3 
of the EPPO initiative does refer to such an action.
A second option would be that this judicial decision be made 
by the Dutch investigating judge who is addressed by the EPPO 
to review the required use of certain investigative measures. 
However, the Dutch investigating judge has no role in any 
prosecuting decision because of the aforementioned monopoly 
on the decision to prosecute assigned to the Dutch public pros-
ecutor. The most likely judicial authority in the Netherlands 
would then be the College of General Prosecutors (procureurs-
generaal). This college stands at the head of the Dutch public 
prosecuting office, is entitled to give general and specific in-
structions to the Dutch public prosecuting office, and is part of 
the judiciary according to the Dutch constitution.37 
To prevent the foreseen procedure of Art. 13 para. 3 from 
leading to unintended controversies, two options should be 
considered. First, the EPPO could make all the final deci-
sions on ancillary competence. This is a simple procedure 
but probably unacceptable to the Dutch parliament and 
government. The second option is that the final decisions 
on ancillary competence in practice could be taken by the 
College of General Prosecutors, accepting the fact that these 
decisions are often influenced by nationally oriented and less 
European-minded sentiments. 
VII.  Conclusion 
It is unlikely that the Dutch parliament and the Dutch govern-
ment will support the EPPO initiative in the near future. One 
argument for its rejection is that the initiative lacks a required 
legal basis. It is also argued that the foreseen competences 
of the EPPO do not seem to be in line with the principle of 
proportionality. Other arguments against the initiative have a 
common line of reasoning: They follow a distinctive interpre-
tation of the concept of sovereignty by which the nation state, 
the Netherlands, is the exclusive legal forum to decide on the 
necessity and implementation of criminal law prosecution and 
investigation. As outlined above, this interpretation seems to 
be outdated but is still put forward by the Dutch institutions. 
However, there are parts of the EPPO initiative – in particular 
as regards the competences of the EPPO – that deserve further 
contemplation, so that a successful enforcement at the national 
level is ensured. To support this enforcement, it seems appro-
priate to provide for a further clarification of the position of 
the delegated public prosecutor and the ancillary competence 
of the EPPO.
What is the way forward? A realistic approach would be not 
to wait too long for the support of the Dutch for the EPPO 
initiative. Art. 86 para. 1 TFEU provides for the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation, i.e., the EPPO can be installed if nine 
Member States support the initiative. Ultimately, the Nether-
lands might not take part because of lacking consent on the 
initiative. 
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LEs Coûts DE LA non-EURoPE
L’Europe à la poursuite des droits fondamentaux
Bertrand Favreau 
Where does the protection of human and fundamental rights stand in Europe, particularly in the European Union of the 28 Eu-
ropean Member states? Where can the « common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law », which 
is evoked in the preamble of the ECHR, be seen today? the article responds to these questions by arguing first that the Euro-
pean Community (later the European Union) has – from the outset – been in a pursuit race regarding the effective protection of 
fundamental rights. Effects of this phenomenon are still apparent today. Examples given in the article show that the European 
Union falls short of the aforementioned common heritage. Regarding asylum rights, for example, the CJEU does not completely 
follow the ECtHR case law. Regarding the European Arrest Warrant, it was a recent call of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court that triggered a change of thinking at the Court in Luxembourg on how the state of execution can protect the fundamental 
rights of the person sought. In the second part, the article further elaborates on how the fundamental rights protection is at test 
regarding the current crises. In this context, it points out the protocols no. 15 and 16 to the ECHR that, according to the author, 
give the states a margin of appreciation that it too large, thus enabling them to avoid respecting the Convention’s guarantees. 
In the third part, the author addresses the (im)possible accession of the EU to the ECHR as foreseen by the treaty of Lisbon. He 
argues that accession currently is in the far distant future and could lead to the persistence of a “double Europe” in which fun-
damental rights and freedoms are insufficiently protected. However, the article does not conclude pessimistically, but argues 
that the European Union can win the pursuit race on fundamental rights.
Peut-être se rendra-t-on compte un jour que l’erreur de l’Eu-
rope, c’est de ne s’être ralliée que trop tard au primat en terme 
d’effectivité de ces droits que l’on appelle au gré des pays ou 
des traductions: droits de l’homme, droits humains ou pour 
reprendre l’expression de la Charte, droits fondamentaux. 
Aujourd’hui, où en sont les droits fondamentaux tels qu’ils 
résultent de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
européenne (ci-dessous « la Charte ») mais aussi tels qu’ils 
sont garantis par la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des 
droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales et tels qu’ils 
résultent des traditions constitutionnelles communes aux États 
membres, qui font partie du droit de l’Union en tant que « prin-
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cipes généraux », pour reprendre une expression figurant dans 
le traité sur l’Union européenne ? Où en est ce « patrimoine 
commun d’idéal et de traditions politiques, de respect de la 
liberté et de prééminence du droit » qu’évoque le 5ème ali-
néa du Préambule de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme, à laquelle tous les États membres de l’Union euro-
péenne sont parties?
Cet article s’attache à relater les failles originelles de l’Union 
Européenne à travers les différentes matières de droit qui ont 
abouti à une course à la poursuite des droits fondamentaux. 
L’article évoque ensuite l’incidence de ces droits au regard 
des crises que traverse l’Europe notamment à l’heure de la 
